Self-Sacrifice Read online

  In early 2011, I had demanded the right to take a small team of MEPs from my Delegation for Relations with Iraq to Baghdad. Our visas were issued in early April, just days before the massacre in Ashraf. This was fortuitous, as they almost certainly would have been withheld following the atrocities at the camp. So we were all set to go and we were given intensive security training and warned that there were considerable risks involved. We were told that travelling outside the so-called ‘Green Zone’ – the high security area in the centre of Baghdad – was lethally dangerous and should be avoided.

  My team consisted of myself and three other MEPs, Mario Mauro (Italy), John Attar Montalto (Malta) and Jelko Kacin (Slovenia). We arrived at the International Airport in Baghdad on 25 April 2011. Baghdad was still a war-zone. The streets were entombed in heavy concrete. Tanks or armoured cars sat at every corner. Machine-guns poked out from behind heaps of sandbags. Concrete bunkers and watchtowers were everywhere. Politicians moved around the city in heavily armoured vehicles. For our high-speed journey from the airport to the Green Zone, we were made to wear full body armour and were taken in pairs inside armoured Lexus 4-WDs, with Iraqi drivers and European security guards, each brandishing sub-machine guns and pistols.

  Our friendly British security guard was a former paratrooper called Mark, from Birmingham. He said he was married to a Scottish girl from Inverness, but only got home to see her every five or six weeks. As we drove out through the numerous security checks surrounding Baghdad’s International Airport, he explained that we were about to drive along ‘Irish Street, once the most dangerous street in the world.’ Reassuringly he said that nowadays there are only occasional roadside bombs and isolated attacks on passing convoys like ours! I asked how well our Lexus would withstand an explosion from an improvised explosive device (IED), and he said that he recently saw a similar vehicle blown several metres into the air by one, then it landed on its roof and yet all of the passengers emerged unhurt!

  With this information ringing in my ears, we raced on towards the city and the first major roadblocks, where queues of cars stood waiting to be searched and the occupants’ identities checked. Mark pointed to two large craters in the road just outside the Green Zone, where suicide bombers had rammed cars into the waiting traffic only a week previously, killing 12 people and injuring more than 50. This was quite unusual, he said, as mostly now al-Qaeda were using a new tactic involving targeted assassinations of Iraqi military and police personnel, usually at roadblocks. ‘They use handguns fitted with silencers and when the soldier or policeman taps on their window to ask for their ID, they open the window and shoot him in the face, before racing off to repeat the performance at the next checkpoint,’ he explained cheerfully. 81 people had been killed in this way in the 16 days before we arrived.

  High, thick concrete walls, topped with razor wire, surrounded our compound in the middle of the Green Zone. A Kalashnikovtoting guard stood at the main entrance gate. I was shown to my underground bunker-room where a notice pinned to the back of my door said: ‘The signal for a missile/mortar attack will be a continuous warbling siren and flashing red lights.’ A khaki-green helmet lay ominously on top of the bedroom drawers, next to a heavy set of body armour.

  I soon discovered that missiles and mortars were a daily part of Baghdad life. Usually they were fired from the remote and desperately poor suburb called Sadr-city, named after Muqtada al-Sadr, the ferociously anti-American Islamic cleric who controls the black-clad Mahdi Army, and is now an elected member of the Iraqi Parliament. Muqtada al-Sadr takes his orders from Iran. He had openly threatened to reignite the insurgency if the Americans did not stick to their promise of complete withdrawal from Iraq by the end of the year. It was a serious threat.

  On our way to visit the Polish Ambassador in the early evening we could suddenly hear sirens wailing. Mark got onto his walkie-talkie and announced that there was ‘an incoming on the way.’

  ‘An incoming what,’ I nervously enquired.

  ‘Oh it’s probably just a rocket or a mortar,’ said Mark. ‘They’re usually aimed at the American Embassy in the heart of the Green Zone, so we should be OK.’

  Sure enough, a few seconds later the ‘All Clear’ signal sounded and Mark received a message on his radio confirming that the mortar had in fact landed in the River Tigris. As we were driving along the side of the River Tigris, this was not entirely reassuring.

  At the Polish Ambassador’s residence we met for dinner with a number of EU ambassadors. We were given an initial comprehensive briefing on the prevailing situation inside Iraq. We were told that Baghdad only had around six hours electricity per day, but they were hoping to reach up to 18 hours per day by the end of the summer, when temperatures can rise to over 50°C, and without air-conditioning, tempers can fray. Kurdistan in particular was thriving economically, with around 10% annual growth, against a background of relative safety and political stability. The general picture seemed to be that Iraq was gradually clawing its way out of the nightmare that it had suffered under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, followed by the US/British invasion and the subsequent insurgency that left tens of thousands dead and the major cities devastated. There seemed to be a consensus among the EU ambassadors that Iraq was potentially open for business and we should do nothing to jeopardise the chance for lucrative business contracts. I can’t say that I was convinced by their arguments!

  I thanked the Polish Ambassador for his hospitality and said that we were here in Baghdad in the immediate wake of the horrific massacre at Camp Ashraf and it was my duty as Head of the Delegation to demand an independent inquiry into the 8 April atrocities, when 36 unarmed civilians from the PMOI were killed and many hundreds injured. I said that the EU must enter into urgent negotiations with the PMOI, the Iraqi government, the US and UNAMI to find a long-term solution to this crisis and to prevent further bloodshed. The re-settlement of the 3,400 residents of Ashraf to the US and to EU Member States was the only feasible option, and would have to be brokered before the end of 2011, the deadline set by the Iraqi government for the closure of Ashraf. However, negotiations could only begin if the Iraqi government first withdrew its military forces from Ashraf, provided urgent medical attention for the critically injured, ended the siege of the camp and restored relative normality to the situation.

  Each of the ambassadors spoke, condemning the attack of 8 April, but each qualifying their remarks with negative points about the PMOI. I said that it was pointless and deeply worrying to hear the usual Mullah-inspired propaganda criticising the 3,400 residents of Ashraf as being Marxist, a listed terrorist organisation and a cult. I said, “These people have been brutally attacked twice now. They are under siege in Ashraf and denied adequate supplies of food, fuel and water; 300 loudspeakers blaring insults day and night constantly harass them and you see fit to direct some criticism at them?” I was very angry, but I could see which way the wind was blowing.

  The next morning, Tuesday 26 April, we met with Ad Melkert, Tahar Boumedra and the UNAMI team. I opened the meeting by raising the question of the lack of fulfilment of the Erbil Agreement and the failure by Maliki to fill the posts of Ministers of Interior, Defence and Security. I said that this was supposed to be a government of national unity, but was looking increasingly like a sectarian government. I said that the massacre at Ashraf had exposed the fault-line in Maliki’s government, demonstrating clearly how he was prepared to abuse power and do the bidding of Iran. The massacre was a violation of everything the EU held dear, and was an appalling humanitarian tragedy for which a fully independent inquiry was needed to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. I reminded them that the European Parliament had twice sent strong resolutions to Iraq demanding an end to the intimidation and siege of Ashraf, with an appeal to the Iraqi authorities never to resort to violence.

  The attack on 8 April showed contempt for the European Parliament and its Members, I said. I agreed that there had to be a long-term solution found for the residents of Ash
raf, as the current situation was intolerable, and there was an increased risk of annihilation of the residents in a Srebrenica-style massacre. I asked Ad Melkert if UNAMI could not quickly embed a unit inside the camp to offer protection, or whether the US could offer military protection while a negotiated settlement was established. I asked whether the UN Security Council could raise this issue and demand protection for the residents of Ashraf. However, I said that there could be no negotiation with the Iraqi government over a long term solution to Ashraf while the residents remained under the threat of the Iraqi military that had now bulldozed a huge embankment from which they could threaten the remaining camp. The troops must be withdrawn, the siege ended, immediate medical assistance provided to the critically wounded and a state of peace and normality restored in the camp. Only then could any resolution be discussed between the EU and Iraq.

  Ad Melkert said that the Iraqi government was determined to close the camp by the end of 2011. They had considerable interaction with Iran on this issue. He said the EU and US position was of vital importance in resolving this issue because UNAMI could only monitor the situation. They could not intervene. Nor would the UN Security Council discuss Ashraf. There was no question of that. UNAMI had demanded an international inquiry into the massacre. Iraq wanted a government inquiry with UN involvement. But if UNAMI was to get involved in any way, the army must withdraw first, he said.

  ‘However,’ Melkert continued, ‘for the UN to be involved they must accept individual registration as refugees. For us, communication with the MEK is vital. We can talk readily enough to the camp leadership in Ashraf, but we need to communicate with the leadership in Paris. We need a channel for this, which you, Mr Stevenson, can provide.’

  Our next meeting was with Osama al-Nujaifi, the Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives. When I launched a tirade against the massacre, the Speaker said, ‘As far as Ashraf is concerned a full investigation is underway into the events of 8th April. But you have to understand that the Iraqi Government has its own side to this story.’ He was clearly not willing to engage any further on this issue.

  We encountered the same reluctance to be drawn on Ashraf from our meeting with the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Council of Representatives, Humam Hammoudi, from the party of Hakim. His excuse was that this was a matter for the chair of the Human Rights Committee, rather than Foreign Affairs. It seemed as if everyone was astonished and embarrassed by the brutal attack ordered by Maliki. Mr Hammoudi did, however, emphasise the need for great friendship and cooperation between the EU and Iraq. I told him that premeditated, extra-judicial murders of unarmed civilians were not the best way of cementing good relations with the EU.

  Continuing our series of meetings with the Council of Representatives, our next port of call was with the Chair of the Security and Defence Committee, Hassan al-Sunaid, a close ally of Maliki and several of his committee members. The Chairman said: ‘Clearly the MEK is the main reason for your visit. We want Iran, Iraq and the MEK to sit together to settle this issue. We are not against the MEK and will always deal with them from a humanitarian position. But you should understand the camp is filled with weapons. I can take you there now and show you them. They attacked neighbouring areas near Ashraf. They attacked our forces. They constantly abuse our Prime Minister and government and call for their downfall. They have abused their position as guests in our country and are no longer welcome. But nevertheless our Committee on Defence and Security will investigate what happened on 8 April and punish those responsible.’

  I thanked Mr al-Sunaid for his kind offer to take me right away to Ashraf to see all the weapons and evidence of terrorism for myself, and said that I readily accepted his suggestion. I asked when we could leave and he simply ignored my question!

  We moved on to meet with Salim Abdullah al-Jabouri,1 chair of the Human Rights Committee. He said that the members of his committee were deeply alarmed at what had happened on the 8th April, but they were aware of the Iraqi sovereignty situation and the situation regarding neighbours like Iran and the provocation to them from Ashraf. He suggested that the UN must take over and help to resolve the issue. But any resolution must respect Iraq’s concerns over sovereignty and Iran.

  We were met with a similar reaction from the Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, a prominent Kurd. He said: ‘You must be clear that the Iraqi Government has no animosity towards the MEK. The US disarmed them and then the US and Bulgaria provided them with protection in Ashraf. I signed the handover agreement of Ashraf. The residents agreed to follow Iraqi laws and we agreed that there would never be any forced extraditions to Iran. We agreed that we would respect their human rights. But now the MEK regard Ashraf as their liberated territory, as if they have conquered it in a war. They are our guests. They cannot seize part of Iraq and claim it as their own. Of course they are strong and effective lobbyists in the US and EU. But in 2009 we asked them to allow our police into the camp and it ended in a riot where 12 people were killed. This year, in April, there was an even worse attack. They have to realise that this is Iraqi land and they are Iranians. They even asked us if they could pay a rent for it! We supplied them with water, electricity and this is how they repay our friendship.’

  Of course I knew that most of his allegations were baseless. The Iraqi government did not provide water and electricity to the Ashraf residents. In fact it was the residents themselves who pumped water from a nearby river, supplying more than 20,000 Iraqis in villages near the camp; US military officers officially confirmed this.

  Zebari continued: ‘Now Iraq and Iran are friends, so the situation has changed. We have tried hard to suggest voluntary repatriation to the Ashraf residents, but the trouble is that no country will agree to take them. This is unfortunate, because the government has taken a clear decision that there is no place for them in Iraq by the end of 2011. The government are prepared to work closely with UNAMI on a solution. Extensive talks have been held with Iran and the Iranians had agreed to voluntarily repatriate to Iran those who wished to return, with a cast-iron guarantee signed by both governments that they would not be arrested or prosecuted. They would even seek the International Commission of the Red Cross cooperation on this. Alternatively, Iran had even agreed to supply all 3,400 residents with Iranian passports so that they could go wherever they liked. So the last window of opportunity is now. We will try to help to re-settle them. As for the 8th April events, there is no clear answer on what happened, but we have launched our own investigation to uncover the truth.’

  I said that there was a very clear answer to what happened on 8th April. It was a massacre by 2,500 heavily armed troops and armoured vehicles ordered by the Prime Minister. I asked if my delegation could go to Ashraf to see for themselves what had happened. Zebari said absolutely not. He could not permit us to visit Ashraf under any circumstances. It was out of the question. I then asked what would happen at the end of the year if all attempts to repatriate the residents of Ashraf had failed. In that case, Zebari said, they would be forcibly moved to an alternative camp.

  Zebari then launched into an astonishing defence of Maliki’s sectarian and divisive policies and added: ‘Our democracy has acted as a spur for the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. Other countries want our freedom. That is why almost every suicide bomber in the Middle East was, for a time, sent to Iraq.’

  I had been led to believe that Zebari’s background and political inclinations differed greatly from those of Maliki, so I was dismayed to discover that he was now prepared to defend the Prime Minister’s repressive sectarian policies, presumably in an effort to hold on to his own high-ranking post. It was disappointing to find an eminent Kurd like Zebari willing to distance himself from the honourable position of the Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. Zebari was even prepared to justify Maliki’s attacks on PMOI members, claiming that they had been involved in assisting Saddam Hussein’s repression of the Iraqi Kurds. This was an astonishing U-turn by Zebari, because I had seen
his own testimony to a Dutch court on 14 July 1999 when he had written as the Head of KDP International Relations that: ‘[We] can confirm that the Mujahedeen [sic] were not involved in suppressing the Kurdish people neither during the uprising nor in its aftermath. We have not come across any evidence to suggest that the Mujahedeen have exercised any hostility towards the people of Iraqi Kurdistan.’2

  Zebari’s veiled threats and hostility to the Ashrafis were refreshingly countered by the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Saleh al-Mutlak, who told us that he felt deeply saddened by the events at Ashraf. ‘I said so to my colleagues in government. It hurts the reputation of Iraq after 5,000 years of civilization that we now resort to murdering unarmed guests. These are unarmed civilians. We need to find a humanitarian solution that involves the EU, Iraq, Iran and UNAMI. But any solution must serve both the interests of the MEK and Iraq. I am happy to cooperate with you to find a solution.’

  That evening, we were taken by our armed security guards to a meeting with the Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, another senior Kurdish political leader. The Presidential Palace is outside the Green Zone, so we had been warned that we must spend no longer than 60 minutes in the meeting. ‘Any longer,’ Mark, our gun-toting guard said, ‘will give terrorists time to target a mortar attack or an ambush, so you have to get out strictly after one hour.’

  President Talabani began by apologising on behalf of Nouri al-Maliki. ‘The Prime Minister is sorry that he cannot meet you, as he is currently in Korea.’ In a rather too audible whisper, I commented, ‘North Korea, I presume?’ The President ignored this and continued by stating: ‘I am personally against all forms of violence. Iran uses the MEK as an excuse to put pressure on us. I went to Tehran and asked them to stop sending arms to terror groups in Iraq. They responded by demanding we close Ashraf. In these circumstances what can we do? We cannot allow them to stay. Terrorists, supplied with weapons by Iran, are killing Christians and other minority communities almost daily.’